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MANUFACTURED NANOMATERIALS: 
AVOIDING TSCA AND OSHA VIOLATIONS 
FOR POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS 
SUBSTANCES 
Peter J. Tomasco*
Abstract: Public and private spending on nanotechnology research and 
development continues to increase. At the same time, government 
agencies around the world are spending millions to assess the potential 
risks to nanotechnology workers, the public, and the environment. 
However, innovative and opportunistic manufacturers are not waiting 
for test results before forging ahead. This Note focuses on the obliga-
tion of such manufacturers under the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA) to report and/or test nanomaterials for their effects on health, 
safety, and the environment prior to their release into the stream of 
commerce. In addition, this Note addresses the duty of manufacturers 
to protect workers from recognized hazards under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act). 
Introduction 
 According to the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and 
Development Act (Nanotechnology Act), “‘nanotechnology’ means 
the science and technology that will enable one to understand, meas-
ure, manipulate, and manufacture at the atomic, molecular, and su-
pramolecular levels, aimed at creating materials, devices, and systems 
with fundamentally new molecular organization, properties, and func-
tions.”1 As this deªnition implies, nanotechnology research and de-
velopment aims to exploit potentially valuable differences in the 
physical properties of nanomaterials as compared to their “normal-
sized” bulk-material counterparts.2
                                                                                                                      
* Solicitations Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2005–
06. 
1 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7509 
(West Supp. 2004). 
2 See Nanoscale Sci., Eng’g, & Tech. Subcomm., Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, The 
National Nanotechnology Initiative Strategic Plan iii (2004), available at http:// 
www.nano.gov/NNI_Strategic_Plan_2004.pdf [hereinafter NNI Strategic Plan]. 
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 The United States government has been investing aggressively in 
nanotechnology for some time, spending $982 million on research 
and development in ªscal year 2005 alone.3 Several states are seeking 
to attract a slice of the $3.8 billion that corporations spent on 
nanotechnology research and development worldwide in 2004.4
 Amidst all this promise and optimism, however, are growing con-
cerns that the health, safety, and environmental risks of nanomaterials 
are poorly understood.5 Preliminary studies of carbon nanotube tox-
icity, for example, proved quite alarming.6 The issue drew enough 
attention in 2004 for Science Magazine to name nanotechnology health 
and environmental regulation as one of seven scientiªc “Areas to 
Watch in 2005.”7
 The most extreme reaction to the perceived risks—short of an 
outright permanent ban—would be for the government to institute a 
moratorium on nanotechnology manufacturing until the risks are bet-
ter understood.8 More likely, the government will have to apply or 
adapt existing environmental laws and regulations to meet the chal-
                                                                                                                      
3 See Nat’l Nanotechnology Initiative, Funding, http://www.nano.gov/html/about/ 
funding.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2005). 
4 See M.C. Roco, The US National Nanotechnology Initiative After 3 Years (2001–2003), 6 J. 
Nanoparticle Res. 1, 1 (2004) (“[O]ver 20 states in [the United States] have realized that 
nanotech has economic potential and in 2002 made a commitment for nanotechnology 
that is more than half the [National Nanotechnology Initiative] annual budget.”) (on ªle 
with author); Global Investment in Nanotechnology by Nations to Rise, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 
2004, at B4. 
5 See generally Vicki L. Colvin, The Potential Environmental Impact of Engineered Nanomate-
rials, 21 Nature Biotechnology 1166 (2003) (outlining potential health, safety, and 
environmental risks). Dave Kriebel, an epidemiologist at the University of Massachusetts at 
Lowell, has said of nanomaterials, “‘[t]he key point of concern is, because these particles 
are so small, they don’t necessarily follow the same toxicologic principles that we under-
stand’.” Carolyn Y. Johnson, One Million Nanotubes Could Fit Into This Period., Boston 
Globe, Feb. 15, 2005, at C1. 
6 See Chiu-Wing Lam et al., Pulmonary Toxicity of Single-Wall Carbon Nanotubes in Mice 7 
and 90 Days After Intratracheal Instillation, 77 Toxicological Sci. 126, 126 (2004), available 
at http://toxsci.oupjournals.org/cgi/reprint/77/1/126 (ªnding that, after instilling a 
suspension of nanotubes directly into the lungs of mice, the nanotubes clumped together 
and stimulated an immune response that resulted in the scarring of lung tissue). 
7 See Areas to Watch in 2005, 306 Sci. 2014, 2014 (2004) (“[R}egulators in areas from 
consumer products, workers’ health, and the environment are grappling with how best to 
ensure health and safety without stiºing what is expected to be a major economic en-
gine.”) 
8 The environmental advocacy organization ETC Group, formerly a vocal opponent of 
genetically-modiªed foods, has turned its attention to the impact of nanotechnology and 
has called for a moratorium on commercial production of new nanomaterials. See Candace 
Stuart, Watchdogs Say Stop Nanotech, Start Worldwide Dialogue, Small Times, Jan. 31, 2003, 
http://www.smalltimes.com/document_display.cfm?document_id=5417. 
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lenge of allowing nanomaterials to be produced without signiªcant 
harm to humans or the environment.9 While the universe of poten-
tially applicable health, safety, and environmental statutes is only as 
limited as the use of nanomaterials themselves, this Note focuses on 
the presumed toxic nature of some nanomaterials. This Note also ex-
amines some of the federal statutory and regulatory issues that would 
arise for a typical corporation manufacturing nanomaterials in the 
near-term.10
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of nanotechnology. Parts 
II and III, respectively, describe federal statutes—the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (OSH Act)—which take different approaches to mitigating the 
risks posed by substances of known and unknown toxicity. Part IV as-
sesses the strengths and deªciencies of each statute as applied to 
nanomaterial manufacturing, and argues that manufacturers should 
adopt a precautionary approach to releasing their nanoproducts into 
the stream of commerce, even if certain regulatory hurdles may be 
overcome by perfunctory compliance with the letter of the law. 
I. Nanotechnology Overview 
 The preªx “nano” “is derived from the Greek word nanos, mean-
ing ‘dwarf’. A nanometre is one thousand millionth of a metre or, in 
other words, one millimetre equals a million nanometres.”11 For pur-
poses of comparison, a ºea is about 1 million nanometers (nm); a red 
blood cell is seven thousand nm; a bacterium is one thousand nm; 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Ahson Wardak, Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars, Nanotechnology 
& Regulation: A Case Study Using the Toxic Substance [sic] Control Act (TSCA) 1–2 
(2003), http://www.foresightandgovernance.org/images/nanotsca_ªnal2.pdf. 
10 Approximately 80% of the companies pursuing nanotechnology are start-ups. See 
Global Investment in Nanotechnology by Nations to Rise, supra note 4. This Note is not con-
cerned with so-called molecular nanotechnology (MNT), deªned as the “purposeful ma-
nipulation of molecules and atoms to construct devices and machines.” Jason Wejnert, 
Note, Regulatory Mechanisms for Molecular Nanotechnology, 44 Jurimetrics J. 323, 325 (2004). 
MNT is generally considered to be in the “workbench or proof-of-concept” stage, as op-
posed to anything likely to be mass-produced anytime soon. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures, 17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 179, 180 (2003); see 
also Paul C. Lin-Easton, Note, It’s Time for Environmentalists to Think Small—Real Small: A Call 
for the Involvement of Environmental Lawyers in Developing Precautionary Policies for Molecular 
Nanotechnology, 14 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 107, 109 (2001) (describing the current state 
of MNT as comparable to “computer and information technology in the 1950s”). 
11 Annabelle Hett, Swiss Re, Nanotechnology: Small Matter, Many Unknowns 5 
(2004), http://www.swissre.com/INTERNET/pwsªlpr.nsf/vwFilebyIDKEYLu/ULUR-5YNGET/ 
$FILE/Publ04_Nanotech_en.pdf. 
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and a ball-shaped virus is between sixty and one hundred nm.12 Scien-
tists reserve the “nano” preªx for materials that range in size from 
about 0.2 nm—the atomic level—to about 100 nm, because that range 
is where different or enhanced properties may be observed.13 As ex-
perts from the United Kingdom’s Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering explain: 
The properties of materials can be different at the nanoscale 
for two main reasons. First, nanomaterials have a relatively 
larger surface area when compared to the same mass of ma-
terial produced in a larger form. This can make materials 
more chemically reactive (in some cases materials that are 
inert in their larger form are reactive when produced in 
their nanoscale form), and affect their strength or electrical 
properties. Second, quantum effects can begin to dominate 
the behaviour of matter at the nanoscale—particularly at the 
lower end—affecting the optical, electrical and magnetic 
behaviour of materials.14
 Attempting to understand and exploit properties inherent in 
nanomaterials is in some sense not new.15 “Nanoparticles occur natu-
rally, and have been created for [millennia] . . . as the products of 
combustion and food cooking.”16 Chemists have been making poly-
mers, composed of chains of nanoparticles, for decades.17 What has 
                                                                                                                      
12 Id. One of the more well-known engineered nanoparticles, Carbon 60—also known as 
a “buckyball”—provides another perspective: “[T]he world is approximately one hundred 
million times larger than [a soccer ball], which is in turn one hundred million times larger 
than a buckyball.” The Royal Soc’y & The Royal Acad. of Eng’g, Nanoscience and 
Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties 4 (2004), available at http:// 
www.nanotec.org.uk/ªnalReport.htm [hereinafter Royal Society]. 
13 Royal Society, supra note 12, at 5. 
14 Id. at vii. The Royal Society goes on to provide a slightly more technical explanation 
of the reactivity of nanomaterials: 
As a particle decreases in size, a greater proportion of atoms are found at the 
surface compared to those inside. For example, a particle of size 30 nm has 
5% of its atoms on its surface, at 10 nm 20% of its atoms, and at 3 nm 50% of 
its atoms. Thus nanoparticles have a much greater surface area per unit mass 
compared with larger particles. As growth and catalytic chemical reactions 
occur at surfaces, this means that a given mass of material in nanoparticulate form 
will be much more reactive than the same mass of material made up of larger particles. 
Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
15 Id. at 5. 
16 Id. at 6. 
17 Id. at 5. 
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changed in recent years is scientists’ ability to investigate, model, and 
manipulate matter at the nanoscale.18 The invention of the scanning 
tunneling microscope (STM) in 1982, and the atomic force microscope 
(AFM) in 1986, have enabled scientists to use “nanoscale probes to im-
age a surface with atomic resolution, and [also made scientists] capable 
of picking up, sliding or dragging atoms or molecules around on sur-
faces to build rudimentary nanostructures.”19 Researchers at all levels 
of government and academia have used these and other precision tools 
to investigate a variety of nanostructures, positing and delivering an 
impressive array of nanotechnology applications.20
A. The Variety of Nanostructures 
 In addition to exploiting novel properties, scientists aim to under-
stand and make use of subtle structural differences among nanostruc-
tures21—differences that can have signiªcant implications for nanoma-
terial manufacturers and government regulators.22 Material properties 
and behavior differ, for example, depending on whether the nanoma-
terial is one-, two-, or three-dimensional.23 For present purposes, mate-
rials of two and three dimensions are of most interest.24
 Examples of two-dimensional nanomaterials include nanowires, 
bipolymers, inorganic nanotubes, and carbon nanotubes (CNTs).25 
CNTs are extended tubes of rolled graphene sheets that resemble 
chicken-wire with a unique and promising combination of physical 
properties.26 “With one hundred times the tensile strength of steel, 
thermal conductivity better than all but the purest diamond, and elec-
trical conductivity similar to copper, but with the ability to carry much 
                                                                                                                      
18 See id. at 6. 
19 Royal Society, supra note 12, at 6. 
20 See id. at 8–13 (describing the variety of nanotechnology applications). 
21 See Risk Assessment Unit, European Comm’n, Nanotechnologies: A Prelimi-
nary Risk Analysis on the Basis of a Workshop Organized in Brussels on 1–2 
March 2004 by the Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General of the 
European Commission 18 (2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_risk/docu 
ments/ev_20040301_en.pdf [hereinafter EC Risk Assessment]. 
22 See Royal Society, supra note 12, at 71. 
23 See id. at 8–10. 
24 One-dimensional nanomaterials include thin ªlms, layers, and engineered surfaces 
which are already widely used in ªelds such as electronic device manufacturing, chemistry, 
and engineering. Royal Society, supra note 12, at 8. 
25 See id. at 9. 
26 See id. at 8 ªg.3.1a. There are two basic types of carbon nanotubes: single-walled, 
which consist of one tube, and multi-walled, which consist of several concentric tubes. See 
id. at 8. 
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higher currents, they seem to be a wonder material.”27 Predictions for 
the global impact of this nanomaterial from CNT enthusiasts are 
nothing short of grandiose.28 For example, some computer memory 
chip manufacturers are working with CNTs “to deliver a product that 
will replace all existing forms of memory, such as DRAM, SRAM and 
ºash memory, . . . . [and] to enable instant-on computers and to re-
place the memory in devices such as cell phones, MP3 players, digital 
cameras, and PDAs . . . .”29 Some are less enthusiastic about the pros-
pects for CNTs, however, preferring to work with silicon nanowires, 
which are similar to CNTs but are easier to manufacture, and other 
more typical semiconductor materials.30
 The third category of nanomaterials is made up of spherical, 
three-dimensional “nanoparticles.”31 Technically, nanoparticles have 
always existed as natural byproducts of photochemical and volcanic 
activity.32 Moreover, humans have been inhaling nanoparticles ever 
since they began cooking food, and more recently have been breath-
ing in nanopollutants from vehicle exhaust.33 This Note, however, is 
concerned only with deliberately manufactured nanoparticles, the 
human health and safety of which remains an open question. 
                                                                                                                      
27 Cientiªca, Nanotubes 12 (2004) (on ªle with author). As the Cientiªca report 
notes, “[t]otal global production capacity of multi-walled nanotubes is higher than 99 tons 
a year and [is] expected to increase to at least 268 tons annually by 2007.” Id. at 9. Global 
production of single-walled nanotubes is currently estimated at 9000 kilograms per year, 
and should increase to approximately 27 tons by 2005, and 100 tons by 2008. Id. 
28 The executive summary of the Cientiªca report concludes: “Despite an inevitable 
element of hype, the versatility of nanotubes does suggest that they might one day rank as 
one of the most important materials ever discovered.” Cientiªca, supra note 27, at 19. 
Although such claims are premature, CNT already are proving quite versatile. See 
Nanotechnology Kills Cancer Cells, BBC News, Aug. 2, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/ 
4734507.stm (reporting how Stanford University researchers recently used coated CNTs to 
kill cancer cells under laboratory conditions, without harm to surrounding tissue). 
29 Nantero, http://www.nantero.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
30 See Burt Helm, The Skinny on Nanotubes, Bus. Wk. Online, Oct. 28, 2004, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2004/tc20041028_4779_tc120.htm. 
31 See EC Risk Assessment, supra note 21, at 18 (discussing distinctions among nano-
particles). 
32 Royal Society, supra note 12, at 9. 
33 Id.; see Todd Campbell et al., Diesel-Electric Hybrid Buses: Addressing the Technical and 
Public Health Issues, Natural Res. Def. Council, Apr. 1999, http://www.nrdc.org/air/ 
transportation/pd-ebus.asp. There is evidence that efforts aimed at reducing larger par-
ticulate matter from diesel engines have actually increased the number of harmful ul-
traªne and nanoparticles in the air, deªned as less than 0.1 microns and 0.05 microns in 
diameter respectively. Id. 
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 One such deliberately manufactured nanoparticle is Carbon 60, 
also known as buckminsterfullerene or a “buckyball.”34 “These are 
spherical molecules about 1 nm in diameter, comprising 60 carbon 
atoms arranged as 20 hexagons and 12 pentagons: the conªguration 
of a [soccer ball].”35 Research for buckyballs and other “fullerenes” is 
focused on surface lubrication, drug delivery, and electronic circuit 
applications.36
 Nanoparticles may be ªxed or free, and coated or uncoated.37 Fixed 
nanoparticles “are embedded in a matrix and cannot move.”38 Free 
nanoparticles, as their name implies, can disperse widely in the envi-
ronment, and, in some cases, enter living organisms—including hu-
mans—and bioaccumulate in tissues and organs.39 Coated nanoparti-
cles remain inert for as long as their coating lasts, and thus tend to 
persist longer in the environment or in the human body than un-
coated nanoparticles.40 Coated nanoparticles also present 
classiªcation difªculties for health, safety, and environmental regula-
tors, as the addition of coating to nanoparticles could cause them to 
behave in novel ways, rendering regulations developed for the origi-
nal nanoparticles of little use.41
B. Current and Future Nanomaterial Applications 
 A brief survey of the many uses of nanomaterials should serve to 
bolster claims that nanotechnology will be “at the heart of America’s 
‘next industrial revolution.’”42 Current and future uses cut across sev-
                                                                                                                      
34 See Royal Society, supra note 12, at 4, 9–10. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 10. Dendrimers comprise another class of popular deliberately manufactured 
nanoparticles, deªned as “spherical polymeric molecules, formed through a nanoscale 
hierarchical self-assembly process.” Id. Like buckyballs, dendrimers might be used as drug-
delivery vehicles in the future, but current applications include use in chemical coatings 
and inks. See id. Of particular interest to environmentalists is some dendrimers’ ability to 
trap metal ions, which could then be ªltered out of contaminated water using ultra-
ªltration techniques. Id. 
37 See EC Risk Assessment, supra note 21, at 18. 
38 Id. Nanosized transistors, for example, can form part of a millimeter-sized chip and 
therefore be “ªxed.” Royal Society, supra note 12, at 35; see also Inªneon Shrinks Transistors 
with Nanotubes, Small Times, Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.smalltimes.com/document_dis 
play.cfm?section_id=29&document_id=8452 [hereinafter Inªneon] (describing one such 
CNT-based transistor). 
39 EC Risk Assessment, supra note 21, at 18. 
40 See id. 
41 See Hett, supra note 11, at 37. 
42 See Rick Weiss, Nanoparticles Toxic in Aquatic Habitat, Study Finds, Wash. Post, Mar. 
29, 2004, at A2. 
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eral disciplines, and include:43 sunscreens and cosmetics,44 compos-
ites,45 clays, coatings and surfaces,46 cutting tools, paints, environ-
mental remediation tools,47 fuel cells, electronic displays, batteries, 
semiconductors,48 fuel additives, chemical catalysts, lubricants, mag-
netic materials, medical implants, water puriªcation,49 and military bat-
tle suits.50 This list is by no means comprehensive. As Horst Stormer, 
Nobel Laureate in Physics, has observed, “‘[n]anotechnology has given 
us the tools to play with the ultimate toy box of nature: atoms and 
molecules’ . . . . ‘Everything is made from these, and the possibilities to 
create new things seem limitless.’”51 This fact has not been lost on the 
international community, prompting another physics professor to re-
mark, “‘[e]very nation in the world is looking at nanotechnology as a 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Royal Society, supra note 12, at 10–13 (describing current and potential appli-
cations of nanomaterials). 
44 Nanosized titanium dioxide is currently used in some commercial sunscreens, as these 
materials are transparent but still absorb and reºect ultraviolet light. Id. at 10; see Jayne Fried, 
DuPont Buys IP for Nanomaterial Seen as Hot in Cosmetics, Coatings, Small Times, July 17, 2002, 
http://www.smalltimes.com/document_display.cfm?section_id=51&document_id=4173. Nan 
osized iron oxide, on the other hand, has properties that enable it to be used as a pigment in 
some lipsticks. Royal Society, supra note 12, at 10. 
45 One type of nanocomposite incorporates multi-walled CNTs to control conductivity 
in anti-static packaging. Royal Society, supra note 12, at 10. 
46 Nanoengineered titanium dioxide has also been used as a coating for a self-cleaning 
window that reduces surface tension such that waterdrops roll off so quickly that they take 
any dust and foreign particles with them. Id. at 10; see Hett, supra note 11, at 34. Re-
searchers have also applied this concept, using silver nanoparticles, to create self-cleaning 
clothes. See John K. Borchardt, Now, the Ever-Clean Suit, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 13, 
2005, at 17. 
47 Several researchers have tried pumping reactive nanoparticles into soil to transform 
heavy pollutants—such as organic solvents or heavy metals—into less harmful substances 
by means of a chemical reaction. Royal Society, supra note 12, at 11; see Hett, supra note 
11, at 27. 
48 See Inªneon, supra note 38 (“Inªneon Technologies AG . . . has created what it’s call-
ing the world’s smallest carbon nanotube-based transistor, another step on the road to 
seeking a replacement to silicon in microelectronic devices.”). 
49 Silver nanoparticles with an antibacterial effect are being tested to determine if they 
can effectively decontaminate drinking water. Hett, supra note 11, at 27; Royal Society, 
supra note 12, at 12–13. 
50 See MIT Inst. for Soldier Nanotechnologies, About ISN, http://web.mit.edu/isn/ 
aboutisn/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (“The ultimate goal is to create a 21st century battle-
suit that combines high-tech capabilities with light weight and comfort. Imagine a bullet-
proof jumpsuit, no thicker than ordinary spandex, that monitors health, eases injuries, 
communicates automatically, and maybe even lends superhuman abilities.”). 
51 Alissa Kaplan Michaels, Columbia Hosts ‘Nano-Day in New York,’ Columbia News 
(N.Y., N.Y.), May 4, 2004, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/04/05/nanoday.html. 
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future technology that will drive its competitive position in the world 
economy.’”52
C. Government and Private Investment in Nanotechnology 
 The United States government has been investing heavily in 
nanotechnology research and development for some time, sprouting 
something of a large nano-bureaucracy along the way.53 The National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) was established in 2001 to coordinate 
nanotechnology research and development throughout the federal 
government.54 In December 2003, Congress passed the 21st Century 
Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, which formalized the 
preexisting bureaucratic arrangement under the less formal NNI, es-
tablished research centers, and appropriated the necessary funds.55 
The Nanoscale Science, Engineering and Technology (NSET) Sub-
committee of the National Science and Technology Council’s Commit-
tee on Technology is responsible for coordinating the research pro-
grams.56 The National Nanotechnology Coordination Ofªce provides 
day-to-day technical and administrative support for NSET activity.57 In 
the ªrst year of NNI, investment totaled $464 million for six agencies.58 
In ªscal year 2006, eleven agencies are now involved and the funding 
request has increased to $1.054 billion.59
                                                                                                                      
52 Hett, supra note 11, at 6 (quoting Neal Lane, Professor of Physics, Rice University). 
53 See Nat’l Nanotechnology Initiative, History, http://www.nano.gov/html/about/ 
history.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). 
54 Roco, supra note 4, at 1; see Nat’l Nanotechnology Initiative, supra note 53. Partici-
pating agencies include: the Consumer Product Safety Commission; the Departments of 
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transporta-
tion, and Treasury; the National Institutes of Health; Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention; the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; the Environmental 
Protection Agency; the Food and Drug Administration; the Intelligence Community; the 
International Trade Commission; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the 
National Science Foundation; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the Patent and 
Trademark Ofªce. Nat’l Nanotechnology Initiative, Government Departments and Agen-
cies, http://www.nano.gov/html/gov/home_gov.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
55 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7501–09 (West Supp. 2004). 
56 See Nat’l Nanotechnology Initiative, supra note 53. 
57 Id. 
58 NNI Strategic Plan, supra note 2, at iii. 
59 Ofªce of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Executive Ofªce of the President, National 
Nanotechnology Initiative, Research and Development Funding in the President’s 
2006 Budget, http://www.ostp.gov/html/budget/2006/One-Pagers/FY06NationalNano 
technologyInitiative1-pager.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
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 Not to be outdone, the race is on at the state level to pass favor-
able legislation60 and otherwise to compete to become centers of 
nanotechnology research and manufacturing.61 For example, in early 
2005, New York Governor George Pataki announced that over $2.7 
billion in private funds had been committed to support semiconduc-
tor and nanotechnology research and development in New York State, 
while Texas Governor Rick Parry unveiled his state’s Nanotechnology 
Workforce Development Initiative, backed by a $500,000 grant.62
 Amidst the fervid interest in nanotechnology, however, are le-
gitimate concerns about the safety of nanomaterials.63 The United 
Kingdom’s Royal Society recommended “that factories and research 
laboratories treat manufactured nanoparticles and nanotubes as if 
they were hazardous . . . [and] that the use of free . . . manufactured 
nanoparticles in environmental applications such as remediation be 
prohibited until appropriate research has been undertaken.”64 A 
closer look at the science that inºuenced this conclusion tends to 
support this precautionary approach. 
D. Possible Adverse Health, Safety, and Environmental Impacts of 
Nanomaterials 
 Human contact with manufactured nanomaterials may occur in 
various ways, including skin absorption, inhalation, and ingestion.65 
For physical harm to occur, a nanomaterial must not only contact or 
enter the body, but also interact with cells, causing tissue-damaging 
reactions.66 For risk underwriters, 
                                                                                                                      
60 See Arkansas Emerging Technology Development Act of 1999, Ark. Code Ann. 
§§ 15-4-2101 to -2107 (2003). Section 15-4-2104 allows tax credits for locating nanotech-
nology facilities within Arkansas. Id. § 15-4-2104. 
61 See David Forman & Candace Stuart, Regional Recap: States Fund, Flaunt Nano Competi-
tiveness, Small Times, Jan. 10, 2005, http://www.smalltimes.com/document_display.cfm? 
document_id=8578. 
62 Id. 
63 See, e.g., Eva Oberdörster, Manufactured Nanomaterials (Fullerenes, C60) Induce Oxidative 
Stress in the Brain of Juvenile Largemouth Bass, 112 Envtl. Health Persp. 1058, 1061–62 
(2004), available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/2004/7021/7021.pdf. 
64 Royal Society, supra note 12, at 85. 
65 Hett, supra note 11, at 15. Since this Note focuses on workplace and general envi-
ronmental exposure, this section omits discussion of the potential implications of ingest-
ing nanoparticles with food. See id. at 19–20 (discussing the possible effects of swallowing 
nanoparticles). 
66 Royal Society, supra note 12, at 36. 
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[a] distinction is made as to whether a substance remains out-
side the body, remains on the surface of the skin or gains ac-
cess to the body and gets into the blood-stream. Special atten-
tion is paid to particularly vulnerable organs such as the brain 
because foreign substances that are able to penetrate into 
such sensitive areas are considered to be particularly exposed 
to product liability.67
1. Skin Absorption 
 “The top layer of skin consists of calloused cells without blood 
supply,” which constitutes a semi-permeable barrier.68 Preliminary stud-
ies have not settled the question of whether nanoparticles can pass 
through the skin’s layers and into the bloodstream.69 Nanosized tita-
nium dioxide, currently used in sunscreen, was declared safe for use as 
an ultraviolet ªlter by a European safety agency.70 The United States 
Food and Drug Administration came to a similar conclusion for “mi-
cronized”—less than two hundred nm—titanium dioxide in 1999.71 But 
these two tentative endorsements of one nanosubstance used in cos-
metics hardly amounts to conclusive proof that nanoparticles are not 
capable of being absorbed through the skin, and there have been calls 
for additional research.72
2. Inhalation 
 If a nanomaterial is released into the air—in the workplace, for 
example—it may be inhaled.73 The small size of nanomaterials en-
sures that inhaling a signiªcant quantity would result in penetration 
deep into the lung.74 Some studies on laboratory animals have sug-
                                                                                                                      
67 Hett, supra note 11, at 15. 
68 Id. at 18. 
69 See id.; see also Burt Helm, The Worries over Nano No-Nos, Bus. Week Online, Feb. 23, 
2005, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2005/tc20050223_6956_tc204. 
htm (“Scientists fear that if the metallic atoms in these lotions get into the body, they’ll create 
free radicals and undergo oxidation reactions, literally pulling cells apart in a fashion similar 
to the way alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking destroy cells.”). 
70 Royal Society, supra note 12, at 44. 
71 See Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-The-Counter Human Use, 64 Fed. Reg. 
27,666, 27,671 (May 21, 1999) (codiªed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 310, 352, 700, & 740). 
72 See Royal Society, supra note 12, at 48. 
73 Id. at 36. 
74 Id. at 42. Nanoparticles are capable of passing through the cell membrane, with the 
possibility of disrupting key cell functions. Id. 
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gested that large doses of carbon nanotubes (CNTs) may be irrespir-
able.75 In fact, perceived similarities between CNTs and asbestos ªbers 
have led to concerns about their safety; the Royal Society, for exam-
ple, has concluded “that there is sufªcient concern about possible 
hazards to those involved in the research and early industrial devel-
opment of nanotubes to control their exposure.”76 Similar concerns 
have been raised regarding fullerenes, with the most alarming study 
suggesting that ªsh may suffer brain damage if exposed to sufªcient 
amounts of fullerenes.77 The author of that study warned: 
Given the rapid onset of brain lipid peroxidation, it is impor-
tant from a preventative point of view to further test manufac-
tured nanomaterials before they are used by humans and in 
industrial applications. If such preventative principles had 
been applied to compounds such as DDT and polychlorinated 
biphenyls, signiªcant environmental damage could have been 
avoided.78
Other researchers share the opinion that precautionary environmental 
policies ought to be adopted immediately until more is understood 
about the risks inherent from human contact with nanomaterials.79
                                                                                                                      
75 See, e.g., D.B. Warheit et al., Comparative Pulmonary Toxicity Assessment of Single-Wall 
Carbon Nanotubes in Rats, 77 Toxicological Sci. 117, 117 (2004), available at http://tox 
sci.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/full/77/1/117. Dr. Warheit’s team instilled single-walled 
carbon nanotube soot mixture into the trachea of rats, with appropriate control groups 
included for comparison purposes. See id. at 117–18. Fifteen percent of the rats treated 
with carbon nanotubes suffocated to death within twenty-four hours due to clumping of 
the nanotubes that obstructed the bronchial passageways. See id. at 117. Granulomas and 
other inºamed-tissue reactions occurred in reaction to the foreign substance. Id. 
76 Royal Society, supra note 12, at 43. The Royal Society also noted that 
[i]t is unlikely that [CNTs] would remain as individual ªbres in the air; 
rather, electrostatic forces probably cause them to clump into masses that are 
less easily inhaled to the deep lung. However, little is known of their aerody-
namic properties and indeed whether they can be present in the air in 
sufªcient numbers to constitute a risk. 
Id. at 42. The Royal Society concluded, however, that “[g]iven previous experience with 
asbestos, we believe that nanotubes deserve special toxicological attention.” Id. at 43. 
77 See generally Oberdörster, supra note 63. 
78 Id. at 1061–62. 
79 See EC Risk Assessment, supra note 21, at 107. C. Vyvyan Howard, Head of Research 
of the Developmental Toxico-Pathology Research Group, unequivocally stated his position: 
We are defenceless against the assimilation of nanoparticles by swallowing, 
inhalation or absorption through the skin. While it is easy to appreciate how 
this can be harnessed to positive pharmaceutical purposes, there is an urgent 
need to curb the generation of unnecessary nanoparticles, particularly of the 
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E. Assessing the Hazard 
 These safety assessments, which are part of a growing body of re-
search into the health, safety, and environmental impacts of nanoma-
terials, have captured the attention of NNI. For ªscal year 2006, NNI 
allocated approximately $81 million for research on the health and 
environmental aspects of nanoscale materials.80 But is that enough to 
assess the hazards of what the National Science Foundation has esti-
mated could be a trillion-dollar industry by 2015?81
 Given the bewildering number of permutations that can occur at 
the molecular level, no amount may ever be “enough” for risk assess-
ment purposes. Rather, NNI should develop an assessment framework 
that works reasonably well for most substances. As Dr. Vicki Colvin, 
Director of the Center for Biological and Environmental Nanotech-
nology,82 has pointed out, “it is far too premature to complete a for-
mal risk assessment for engineered nanomaterials—in fact, it may 
never be possible with such a broad class of substances.”83
 Parts II and III of this Note describe two federal statutes—the 
Toxic Substances Control Act and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970—which take different approaches to mitigating the risks 
posed by substances of both known and unknown toxicity. 
                                                                                                                      
insoluble variety. There is already enough evidence available, to demonstrate 
that nanoparticles are likely to pose a health hazard and that human expo-
sure in general, and in particular exposure of pregnant women and in the 
workplace, should be minimised on a precautionary basis. We are dealing 
with a potentially hazardous process. Full hazard assessments should be per-
formed to establish the safety of each type of nanoparticle before manufac-
turing is licensed. 
Id. 
80 Nat’l Nanotechnology Initiative, Funding for Social Dimensions, http://www.nano. 
gov/html/society/Funding_SocDim.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
81 See Sarah Graham, Nanotech: It’s Not Easy Being Green, Sci. American.com, July 28, 2003, 
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=00077C33-511E-1F20-B8E780A84189EEDF& 
sc=I100322. 
82 Ctr. for Biological and Envtl. Nanotechnology, Center Administration, http://cben. 
rice.edu/about.cfm?doc_id=5001 (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
83 Colvin, supra note 5, at 1166. Furthermore, Dr. Colvin has also noted that pressing 
funding managers to focus on potential drawbacks to a trendy technology can be difªcult 
because “‘[t]he immediate payback for research that demonstrates ways of using nanoma-
terials to cure disease . . . is greater than the reward for uncovering that nanomaterial may 
cause disease.’” Hett, supra note 11, at 29 (quoting Vicki L. Colvin). 
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II. The Toxic Substances Control Act 
 The ªrst policy stated by Congress in the Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA) is that “adequate data should be developed with respect to 
the effect of chemical substances and mixtures on health and the envi-
ronment and that the development of such data should be the respon-
sibility of those who manufacture and those who process such chemical 
substances and mixtures.”84 But what exactly is a “chemical substance” 
for TSCA purposes?85
 Section 2602(2)(A) provides: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term “chemical 
substance” means any organic or inorganic substance of a 
particular molecular identity, including—  
 (i) any combination of such substances occurring in whole 
or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in 
nature and 
 (ii) any element or uncombined radical.86
Exactly in accord with congressional intent, this broad deªnition 
sweeps in a large number of potentially hazardous substances. In ef-
fect, TSCA ªlls the gap left by other federal environmental statutes, 
which for the most part do not assess the adverse effects of chemical 
substances on human health and the environment.87
A. Classiªcation Issues: When Is a Chemical Substance “New”? 
 Under section 5(a) of TSCA, anyone who wishes to manufacture 
or import a “new” chemical substance must ªle a Premanufacture 
Notiªcation (PMN) with EPA.88 Speciªcally, before any new chemical 
substance is imported or manufactured, or any existing chemical is 
put to a “signiªcant new use,” PMNs require that EPA be given ninety 
days notice.89 The burden is on the manufacturer or importer to de-
                                                                                                                      
84 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2000). 
85 See Wardak, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
86 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A). Mixtures, pesticides, tobacco, nuclear materials, and certain 
food and drugs are among the items exempted from TSCA’s reporting requirements. See 
id. § 2602 (2)(B). 
87 See Cynthia A. Lewis & James M. Thunder, Federal Chemical Regulation: 
TSCA, EPCRA, and the Pollution Prevention Act 79 (1997). 
88 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1); Ginger L. Grifªn, The TSCA Compliance Handbook 11 
(3d ed. 1996). 
89 Grifªn, supra note 88, at 11; see 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a). 
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termine whether or not a substance is new.90 To determine this, a 
manufacturer would look ªrst to the TSCA Chemical Substance In-
ventory (Inventory).91
 The Inventory contains both public and conªdential portions; 
EPA maintains the conªdential portion in order to protect proprie-
tary chemical information.92 If the substance is already listed on the 
public portion of the Inventory, it is an existing chemical, and the 
manufacturer is free to begin producing the chemical and has no ob-
ligation to submit a PMN pursuant to section 5.93 If it is not in the 
public portion of the Inventory, a manufacturer would have to ªle a 
Bona Fide Intent to Manufacture with EPA—a process that can take 
up to thirty days—to determine if the substance is in the conªdential 
portion.94 Assuming the chemical is not in the Inventory, the manu-
facturer or importer will have to consider ªling a PMN, unless any of 
a number of statutory exemptions can be invoked.95
B. Statutory Exemptions 
 A number of statutory exemptions to a PMN ªling are available.96 
First, exempted completely from TSCA regulation are entire classes of 
materials that are regulated elsewhere, including: pesticides, tobacco 
products, nuclear material, ªrearms and ammunition, food and food 
additives, drugs and medical devices, and cosmetics.97 No PMN is re-
quired for impurities and by-products without a separate commercial 
use, nor is a PMN required for “mixtures” that result from combining 
two chemicals that are already in the Inventory.98 Other common ex-
                                                                                                                      
90 Grifªn, supra note 88, at 11. 
91 Id. “There are approximately 75,000 chemical substances, as deªned in Section 3 of 
the TSCA, on the Inventory at this time.” EPA, New Chemicals Program, What Is the TSCA 
Chemical Substance Inventory?, http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/newchems/invntory.htm 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2005). Before a chemical would appear in the TSCA Chemical Sub-
stance Inventory (Inventory), it probably must be given a Chemical Abstracts Service Reg-
istry Number (CASRN). See Wardak, supra note 9, at 10. CASRNs are unique identifying 
numbers, which are given to virtually every new chemical and are internationally recog-
nized. CAS Registry, http://www.cas.org/EO/regsys.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2005). The 
Chemical Abstracts Service Registry contains over 26 million organic and inorganic sub-
stances and 56 million chemical sequences. Id. 
92 See Grifªn, supra note 88, at 13. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 13–14. 
95 Id. at 14. 
96 See Wardak, supra note 9, at 11–12. 
97 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B) (2000). 
98 Grifªn, supra note 88, at 15. 
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emptions include: the Research and Development Exemption (R&D), 
the Solely-for-Export Exemption, the Low-Volume Exemption, the Low-
Release and Exposure Exemption (LoREx), and the Test-Marketing 
Exemption.99
 The R&D and the Test-Marketing exemptions can only be in-
voked if small quantities of chemicals will be produced.100 R&D activi-
ties include synthesis of, or research on, new chemical substances.101 
The Low-Volume and LoREx exemptions can only be invoked if the 
manufacturer intends to produce less than ten thousand kilograms— 
or about twenty-two thousand pounds—of chemicals per year.102
C. The Premanufacture Notiªcation Process 
 Assuming the PMN process cannot be circumvented, a chemical 
manufacturer has a number of potential issues to address.103 TSCA 
section 5(a) mandates that if a manufacturer is going to produce or 
import a new chemical, it must notify EPA of its intention to do so 
ninety days in advance.104 The manufacturer also must provide EPA 
with “data which the [submitter] . . . believes show[s] that . . . the 
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, and disposal 
of the chemical substance . . . will not present an unreasonable risk of 
injury to health or the environment.”105 The purpose of submitting a 
PMN is to give EPA an opportunity to screen the chemical for health 
and environmental risks.106 If EPA does not use this opportunity to 
screen the chemicals, the production may go forward despite the lack 
of testing.107 Most importantly, if a company has no toxicity data for a 
given chemical, the manufacturer is only required to submit data that 
already exists elsewhere,108 or may simply rely on information for 
                                                                                                                      
99 See Wardak, supra note 9, at 11–12; Lewis & Thunder, supra note 87, at 50. 
100 See Grifªn, supra note 88, at 15–16. 
101 Id. at 16. 
102 Id. at 17. 
103 See Premanufacture Notiªcation, 40 C.F.R. § 720 (2004) (mandating procedures for 
PMN compliance); see also Grifªn, supra note 89, at 11–34 (providing step-by-step over-
view of the PMN process). 
104 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2000). 
105 Id. § 2604(b)(2)(B). 
106 John S. Applegate et al., The Regulation of Toxic Substances and Hazard-
ous Wastes 611 (2000); see 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(1)(A). 
107 See Applegate et al., supra note 106, at 611. 
108 See Grifªn, supra note 88, at 23, 28. 
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chemicals that are structurally analogous to the one being re-
viewed.109
 EPA can also seek to delay production if it ªnds that additional 
data is necessary to understand a chemical’s risk-proªle.110 If in EPA’s 
estimation the PMN information reveals unreasonable risk, EPA may 
issue a proposed rule that becomes effective immediately.111 EPA may 
have to go to court to prevent production if it ªnds that the chemical 
“may present” an unreasonable risk; however, EPA may act on its own 
if it ªnds that the chemical “presents or will present” an unreasonable 
risk.112
 One key advantage to not ªling a PMN is that a manufacturer 
would be exempt from producing or offering studies describing the 
material’s safety.113 If subject to the PMN process, the manufacturer 
must provide copies of all health and environmental effects test data 
relating to the substance that are in its possession or control.114 The 
manufacturer must also provide descriptions of all other health and 
environmental effects data that it knows about or can reasonably as-
certain.115
 The term “known to or reasonably ascertainable” covers “all in-
formation in a person’s possession or control, plus all information that 
a reasonable person similarly situated might be expected to possess, 
control, or know.”116 The cost and burden to the submitter in obtaining 
information is considered by EPA in determining whether such infor-
mation is known or reasonably ascertainable by a manufacturer.117 
Thus, what is reasonable to a large company with a sizable research 
budget would not necessarily be reasonable to a small startup.118 Regu-
lators have also sought to curb abuse of shell corporation setups by 
deªning “possession or control” to mean “in possession or control of 
the submitter, or of any subsidiary, partnership . . . [or] parent com-
pany.”119
                                                                                                                      
109 Id. at 28. 
110 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e). 
111 See id. § 2605(d). 
112 Id. § 2604(e)(1)(A), (f); Applegate et al., supra note 106, at 611. 
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b); Grifªn, supra note 88, at 22. 
114 15 U.S.C. § 2604(d)(1)(B). 
115 Id. § 2604(d)(1)(C). 
116 Premanufacture Notiªcation, 40 C.F.R. § 720.3(p) (2004). 
117 Grifªn, supra note 88, at 23. 
118 Id. at 23. 
119 40 C.F.R. § 720.3(y). 
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D. The Fate of Filed Premanufacture Notiªcations 
 However, despite the ominous statutory language, a closer look at 
the fate of ªled PMNs reveals that being forced to submit a PMN 
might not be so disagreeable after all. For example, in 1983, the 
Ofªce of Technology Assessment reported that approximately ªfty 
percent of PMNs included no toxicity information at all, and less than 
twenty percent provided ªgures on long-term toxicity.120 Three thou-
sand PMNs were ªled in 1988; twenty-three hundred in 1995; and 
ªfteen hundred in 1997.121 In ªscal year 1987–88, EPA stated that it 
took no action on ninety percent of PMNs; in 1995, EPA took no ac-
tion on ninety-eight percent of PMNs.122
E. The Toxic Substances Control Act Section 8 Reporting Requirements 
 Section 8(a) of TSCA requires chemical manufacturers to keep 
records and make certain reports to EPA.123 Section 8(a)(2) speciªes 
that EPA may require reports on a chemical substance containing the 
substance’s chemical identity, trade name, molecular structure, pro-
posed use, amounts manufactured or processed, resultant by-products, 
“[a]ll existing data concerning the environmental and health effects of 
such substance,” the number of persons exposed, and the method of 
disposal.124 In addition, section 8(d) essentially mandates manufactur-
ers, processors, and distributors to provide EPA with access to unpub-
lished studies that EPA would not know about otherwise.125
F. The Toxic Substances Control Act Section 4 Testing 
 In contrast to the screening function of section 5 PMNs, and the 
information-gathering function of section 8, section 4 allows EPA to 
require that manufacturers generate new test data in the face of un-
reasonable risk or substantial human exposure.126 After an initial 
screen of chemical safety based on existing data, if EPA ªnds that not 
enough information exists to determine whether a chemical poses an 
                                                                                                                      
120 Applegate et al., supra note 106, at 611. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (2000); Grifªn, supra note 88, at 53. 
124 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(2). 
125 Grifªn, supra note 88, at 55; see Premanufacture Notiªcation, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 720.3(k)(1). 
126 See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a). 
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unreasonable risk, it may list the chemical for testing consideration.127 
The multi-agency Interagency Testing Committee (ITC) also recom-
mends chemicals for testing through its Priority Testing List (PTL).128 
If either by its own determination or on recommendation from ITC 
EPA determines that a chemical needs testing, it may promulgate a 
formal test rule or enter into a voluntary testing consent agreement 
with the manufacturer.129
1. When Will EPA Take Action Under the Toxic Substances Control 
Act Section 4? 
 Section 4(a)(1)(A) allows EPA to take action if: 
 (i) [T]he manufacture . . . of a chemical substance . . . 
may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment, 
 (ii) there are insufªcient data and experience upon which 
the effects of such manufacture . . . of such substance . . . on 
health or the environment can reasonably be determined or 
predicted, and 
 (iii) testing of such substance . . . is necessary to develop 
such data . . . .130
In addition, Congress has enacted the so-called “B-policy” of TSCA 
testing, which empowers EPA to take action if: 
(i) [A] chemical substance or mixture is or will be produced 
in substantial quantities, and (I) it enters or may reasonably 
be anticipated to enter the environment in substantial quan-
tities or (II) there is or may be signiªcant or substantial hu-
man exposure to such substance or mixture, [and there are 
insufªcient data and a need to develop such data, as in sub-
section A].131
                                                                                                                      
127 Grifªn, supra note 88, at 35. 
128 See id. at 36–37; see, e.g., Fifty-Fifth Report of the TSCA Interagency Testing Commit-
tee to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 70 Fed. Reg. 7364, 7366 
(Feb. 11, 2005); Fifty-Fourth Report of the TSCA Interagency Testing Committee to the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,528, 33,530 ( June 
15, 2004). The list may not exceed ªfty chemicals at one time, which arguably limits the 
PTL’s effectiveness and shortens the list of chemicals under serious scrutiny. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2603(e)(1)(A). 
129 Grifªn, supra note 88, at 35. 
130 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A). 
131 Id. § 2603(a)(1)(B). 
224 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:205 
Both the courts and EPA have struggled to deªne the basis for an 
“unreasonable risk” to health, to the indisputable detriment of the 
TSCA testing regime. 
2. Deªning “Unreasonable Risk” and “Substantial and Signiªcant 
Exposure” 
 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n 
v. EPA interpreted TSCA to hold EPA to less than the common law’s 
“preponderance of evidence” test in ªnding an unreasonable risk un-
der section 4(a)(1)(A)—what the court called a “more-than-theoretical 
basis” for ªnding an unreasonable risk.132 As for substantial and 
signiªcant exposure, in a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision con-
cerning a test rule on the chemical cumene, the court struggled to un-
derstand what EPA meant by “substantial” exposure.133 For example, 
the court analyzed EPA’s stated rationale for when it will make the re-
quired ªndings under subsections A and B of section 4(a)(1) by exam-
ining the following language from EPA’s Federal Register notice for a 
proposed test rule on Chloromethane and Chlorinated Benzenes: 
“While there is a need to show a potential for exposure in or-
der to make a Section 4(a)(1)(A) ªnding, the exposure 
threshold is much lower than that under Section 4(a)(1)(B). 
This is because the former . . . ªnding was intended to focus 
on those instances where EPA has a scientiªc basis for suspect-
ing potential toxicity and reºects that the potential for risk to 
humans may be signiªcant even when the potential for expo-
sure seems small as, for example, when the chemical is discov-
ered to be hazardous at very low levels. In contrast, the 
4(a)(1)(B) ªnding was intended to allow EPA to require test-
ing, not because of suspicions about the chemical’s safety, but 
because there may be substantial or signiªcant human expo-
sure to a chemical whose hazards have not been explored.”134
                                                                                                                      
132 See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA (CMA I ), 859 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The 
probability of infrequent or even one-time exposure to individuals can warrant a test rule, 
so long as there is a more-than-theoretical basis for determining that exposure in such 
doses presents an ‘unreasonable risk of injury to health.’”). 
133 See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA (CMA II ), 899 F.2d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 1990). 
134 Id. at 358 n.20 (quoting Chloromethane and Chlorinated Benzenes Proposed Test 
Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,524, 48,528 ( July 18, 1980)). 
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The Fifth Circuit, not satisªed with this and other explanations, ulti-
mately remanded the test rule to EPA to reªne what is meant by “sub-
stantial” exposure to a chemical.135
 EPA responded by issuing “TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final State-
ment of Policy,” which deªnes “substantial production” and “substantial 
release,” in addition to “substantial and signiªcant human expo-
sure.”136 “Substantial production” was deªned to be a “threshold value 
of 1 million pounds” for all manufacturers of a chemical.137 One mil-
lion pounds was chosen in part because it “narrows the ‘universe’ of 
chemicals potentially subject to TSCA section 4 testing . . . to 11 per-
cent of the TSCA inventory.”138 EPA deªned the human exposure cri-
teria guidelines with respect to three categories of persons affected: the 
general population, consumers, and workers.139 For the general popu-
lation, exposure to 100,000 people is considered “substantial,” while 
exposure to a lesser number of people would be considered 
“signiªcant” if those people were exposed “more directly or on a rou-
tine or episodic basis.”140 The same framework applies to consumers 
and workers, except the quantitative threshold for consumers is ten 
thousand people, while the threshold for workers is one thousand peo-
ple.141 EPA also reserves the right to dispense with the numerical 
thresholds when necessary, if “additional factors” weigh in favor of test-
ing under the B-policy: 
In some cases, however, where the thresholds are not met, it 
may be more appropriate to use a case-by-case approach for 
making ªndings by applying other considerations. . . . [Thus,] 
EPA may consider “additional factors” for making ªndings for 
substances which do not meet the numerical thresholds ar-
ticulated herein for evaluating existing chemicals under TSCA 
section 4(a)(1)(B).142
 However, although consideration of additional factors gives EPA a 
certain degree of freedom to order testing under the B-policy, the pro-
cedure for ordering testing remains formal and rigid. For example, the 
                                                                                                                      
135 See id. at 360. 
136 TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy, 58 Fed. Reg. 28,736, 28,746 
(May 14, 1993). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 28,740. 
139 Id. at 28,746. 
140 Id. at 28,746 tbl.1. 
141 Id. 
142 TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy, 58 Fed. Reg. at 28,746. 
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plaintiffs in Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Leavitt at-
tempted to prevent EPA from implementing its High Production Vol-
ume (HPV) Challenge Program, whereby chemical manufacturers 
would volunteer to gather data and test certain HPV chemicals.143 The 
plaintiffs argued that EPA had a non-discretionary duty to initiate for-
mal rulemaking and testing under the B-policy because EPA had made 
“de facto . . . ªndings of substantial production, substantial release 
and/or substantial human exposure.”144 The plaintiffs based the con-
tention that the requisite ªndings had been made on EPA’s unsup-
ported statements published in the Federal Register and made in presen-
tations to Congress.145 For example, EPA made the commonsense 
assertion in the Federal Register that “[i]t is generally accepted that 
chemicals having a high level of production have an increased potential 
for exposure in comparison to low production volume chemicals.”146 
The Leavitt court found, however, that the plaintiffs “proffered no evi-
dence to indicate that the general statements made by EPA were the 
product of an analysis that in any way approximates, or can be substi-
tuted for, the type of analysis that would be required for a formal 
ªnding of substantial release and/or substantial exposure.”147 As a re-
sult, the court sided with EPA, preserving EPA’s alternative testing ar-
rangement with industry.148
 A glance at the “type of analysis required” goes a long way in ex-
plaining why EPA would prefer alternative testing arrangements to 
formal rulemaking.149 Promulgation of formal test rules is not only 
                                                                                                                      
143 See 331 F. Supp. 2d 204, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
144 Id. at 205. 
145 Id. at 205–06. 
146 Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, 
65 Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,688 (Dec. 26, 2000). 
147 331 F. Supp. 2d at 207. 
148 Id. 
149 See id. The court explains the quintessentially bureaucratic analysis required: 
[F]ormal proceedings on this issue would normally have involved: (a) the es-
tablishment of a workgroup within EPA’s Ofªce of Pollution Prevention and 
Toxics (“OPPT”) to conduct a review regarding which HPV Program chemi-
cals satisfy the statutory requirements for rulemaking, what data exist to sup-
port the making of Section 4 ªndings and the development of proposed test 
rules to ªll in data gaps for HPV Program chemicals; (b) the presentation of 
information from the OPPT workgroup to the OPPT Ofªce Director, whose 
task it would then be to make a recommendation to the Assistant Administra-
tor for the Ofªce of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances (“OPPTS”), 
who is the only EPA ofªcial (besides the Administrator) authorized to make 
Section 4 ªndings . . . . 
Id. 
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time-consuming, but expensive.150 Thus, EPA and industry will often 
enter into testing consent agreements instead.151 These agreements are 
entered into by EPA with individual manufacturers, or groups of manu-
facturers that have formed consortiums to share costs.152 A formal test 
rule would apply to all manufacturers, while a consent agreement can 
allow testing to commence without having every conceivable constitu-
ent involved.153 In addition, some manufacturers have beneªted from 
taking the lead in suggesting testing methods that EPA has neither the 
time nor the inclination to oppose aggressively.154
G. The Toxic Substances and Control Act Penalties 
 Section 16 identiªes the penalties for TSCA violations.155 EPA is 
authorized to impose a civil penalty of up to twenty-ªve thousand dol-
lars per violation, with each day of violation constituting a separately 
punishable act.156 In addition, any person who “knowingly or willfully” 
violates a TSCA provision may be subject to an additional criminal 
penalty of twenty-ªve thousand dollars per day for each violation, im-
prisonment up to one year, or both.157
III. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
 As discussed in Part II, the main function of TSCA is to place a 
reporting burden on manufacturers and importers of chemical sub-
stances. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), 
on the other hand, imposes two broad duties on all employers, re-
gardless of an employer’s line of business. 
 The ªrst duty, known as the “general duty clause” mandates that 
each employer “furnish to each of his employees employment and a 
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are 
                                                                                                                      
150 See Applegate et al., supra note 106, at 618 (noting that proposed test rules on 
glycidols would cost $18 million and estimates for ºuoroalkane testing ranged from $4.8 to 
$9 million). 
151 See id. at 619–20. If ITC has recommended a chemical for testing, however, use of 
voluntary testing consent agreements is unlawful absent a showing that formal testing is 
not necessary. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 1255, 1261, 1262 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
152 See Grifªn, supra note 88, at 42. 
153 See id. at 42–43. 
154 See id. at 46 (noting that some chemical manufacturers have found that a “proactive 
approach” to negotiations with EPA is “most effective”). 
155 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (2000). 
156 Id. § 2615(a). 
157 Id. § 2615(b). 
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causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his 
employees.”158 The general duty clause was enacted to deal with haz-
ards to which no speciªc standard applies.159
 The second broad duty requires each employer to “comply with oc-
cupational safety and health standards promulgated under this chapter,” 
and enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA).160 The Hazard Communication Standard (HCS)—a worker’s 
“right-to-know” law—is arguably the most important OSHA regulation: 
The purpose of [HCS] is to ensure that the hazards of all 
chemicals produced or imported are evaluated, and that in-
formation concerning their hazards is transmitted to em-
ployers and employees. This transmittal of information is to 
be accomplished by means of comprehensive hazard com-
munication programs, which are to include container label-
ing and other forms of warning, material safety data sheets 
and employee training.161
A. The General Duty Clause 
 The absence of a chemical-speciªc OSHA rule does not mean a 
manufacturer may be lax in its investigation of chemical safety.162 A 
manufacturer can receive a citation under OSH Act’s general duty 
clause for failing to render its workplace free of a recognized haz-
ard.163 The courts have applied a number of tests to determine 
whether a hazard is “recognized.”164
 Some courts have held that a hazard is considered “recognized” if 
in the employer’s industry it is common knowledge, or if the employer 
had knowledge of the hazardous condition.165 In National Realty & Con-
struction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, the D.C. 
                                                                                                                      
158 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) 
(2000). 
159 Mark A. Rothstein, Occupational Safety and Health Law 178 (3d ed. 1990). 
160 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2). 
161 Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(1) (2004); Jennifer C. Silk et 
al., Hazard Communication Compliance Manual 1 ( Jennifer C. Silk & Martha B. Kent 
eds., 1995). 
162 See Rothstein, supra note 159, at 178. 
163 See id. at 179. 
164 See, e.g., Am. Smelting & Reªning Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 501 F.2d 504, 511 (8th Cir. 1974); Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
165 Rothstein, supra note 159, at 185. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals held that whether a hazard is recognized by an 
industry is determined by “the common knowledge of safety experts 
who are familiar with the circumstances of the industry or activity in 
question.”166 In American Smelting & Reªning Co. v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Commission, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
a recognized hazard is not limited to hazards that are readily detectable 
by human senses, but also covers hazards that can only be monitored 
through instrumentation.167 Finally, standards developed by the Ameri-
can National Standards Institute may also be used to prove industry 
recognition.168
 An employer’s duty to render the workplace free from recognized 
hazards extends beyond mere perfunctory compliance with promul-
gated standards.169 The D.C. Circuit has gone as far as to impose a pen-
alty under the general duty clause where a manufacturer knew that 
compliance with a certain standard for a recognized hazard was inade-
quate to protect worker safety: “[I]f . . . an employer knows a particular 
safety standard is inadequate to protect his workers against [a] speciªc 
hazard . . . he has a duty under section 5(a)(1) to take whatever meas-
ures may be required by the Act . . . to safeguard his workers.”170
B. The Hazard Communication Standard 
 The primary purpose of the HCS is to ensure that manufacturers 
seek out and evaluate all the available scientiªc information on a mate-
rial, which is then made available to anyone in the stream of com-
merce.171 The starting point for hazard evaluation is two lists of chemi-
cals: “Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical 
Agents in the Work Environment”, adopted by the American Confer-
ence of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH); and a list of 
chemicals created and maintained by OSHA.172 This group of chemi-
cals is only the “ºoor” of the universe of all potentially hazardous 
                                                                                                                      
166 489 F.2d at 1265 n.32. 
167 501 F.2d 504, 511 (8th Cir. 1974). 
168 See St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 647 
F.2d 840, 845 n.8 (8th Cir. 1981). ANSI “is a private, non-proªt organization . . . that ad-
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system.” Am. Nat’l Standards Inst, About ANSI Overview, http://www.ansi.org (follow 
“About ANSI” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
169 See Rothstein, supra note 159, at 179. 
170 UAW v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
171 Silk et al., supra note 161, at 11. 
172 See id. at 18; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910, subpt. Z (2004). 
230 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:205 
chemicals, however.173 For all other chemicals, the manufacturer is re-
quired to determine if a chemical is a physical or a health hazard by 
conducting tests and searching for relevant scientiªc studies.174 Cru-
cially, the HCS only requires that there be one scientiªc study address-
ing a material’s adverse impact to deem it a “health hazard” that de-
mands hazard communication to affected parties.175
 A full hazard communication is effected by the combination of 
three essential components: labeling, a Material Safety Data Sheet 
(MSDS), and employee training.176 The label provides a summary of 
the chemical’s hazards and warns the employee to take precautions if 
necessary.177 The MSDS is more extensive and has been described as a 
“one-stop shopping document for the user,” providing information on 
a chemical’s properties, hazards, and appropriate protective meas-
ures.178 The ªnal component, employee training, ensures that employ-
ees or other handlers understand the risks and precautionary measures 
identiªed on the label and MSDS.179 This provides assurance that em-
ployees actually respond appropriately when confronting a potential or 
known hazard.180
C. Emergency Temporary Standards and Substance-Speciªc Standards 
 OSHA is permitted to adopt an Emergency Temporary Standard 
(ETS) when it appears “that employees are exposed to grave danger 
from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physi-
cally harmful or from new hazards.”181 There must be “more than some 
possibility” of a grave danger, but absolute certainty is not required.182 
                                                                                                                      
173 See Silk et al., supra note 161, at 19. 
174 Id. at 20. 
175 According to the HCS, 
“Health hazard” means a chemical for which there is statistically signiªcant 
evidence based on at least one study conducted in accordance with estab-
lished scientiªc principles that acute or chronic health effects may occur in 
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176 See Silk et al., supra note 161, at 12. 
177 See id. at 13. 
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180 See id. 
181 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (2000). 
182 See Dry Color Mfrs. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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Also, when evidence of harmful effects on humans is not available, evi-
dence from animal studies is permitted to suggest possible carcinogenic 
effects in humans.183
 In addition, an ETS is not subject to the rulemaking require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act due to the presumed im-
mediate, grave danger involved.184 An ETS, however, may only be is-
sued for a six-month period; thereafter, a permanent speciªc standard 
must be promulgated.185 In practice, courts are disinclined to order 
OSHA to issue an ETS both because of courts’ traditional reluctance 
to substitute their judgment for that of administrative agencies,186 and 
the diversion of resources from other, arguably more pressing rule-
making that such an order would impose.187
 When OSHA does promulgate a speciªc standard, it has 
signiªcant leeway to determine the threshold amount of evidence re-
quired to trigger rulemaking. In Industrial Union Department v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute, a case concerning the permissible exposure 
limit (PEL) of benzene, the Supreme Court explained that: 
OSHA is not required to support its ªnding that a signiªcant 
risk exists with anything approaching scientiªc certainty. Al-
though the Agency’s ªndings must be supported by substan-
tial evidence . . . a reviewing court [is required] to give 
OSHA some leeway where its ªndings must be made on the 
frontiers of scientiªc knowledge.188
This holding effectively allows OSHA to err on the side of caution 
when promulgating a PEL, as long as the standard is supported by a 
body of “reputable scientiªc thought.”189
 However, as John M. Mendeloff explains, even a cautious ap-
proach to promulgating PELs will not always adequately protect 
worker safety.190 Mendeloff argues that there are actually four catego-
                                                                                                                      
183 See Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160–61 (3d 
Cir. 1974). 
184 Rothstein, supra note 159, at 53. 
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187 Rothstein, supra note 159, at 71. 
188 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980). 
189 Rothstein, supra note 159, at 84. 
190 See John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How 
Overregulation Causes Underregulation at OSHA 78 (1988) (noting how disease 
may result even when OSHA has promulgated a PEL). 
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ries of occupational diseases that are caused by exposure to toxic sub-
stances in the workplace: diseases resulting from exposure that ex-
ceed an OSHA PEL; diseases resulting from exposure below an exist-
ing OSHA PEL; diseases resulting from exposure to substances for 
which there is no PEL but for which ACGIH or other groups have 
proposed exposure limits; or diseases resulting from exposure to ex-
isting substances for which neither OSHA nor anyone else has pro-
posed exposure limits.191
 In part because of this inevitable element of uncertainty, OSHA 
has signiªcant latitude to determine the methods of compliance with 
promulgated PELs. OSHA has stated its preference “that engineering 
and work practice controls be used as the primary method of comply-
ing with PEL’s.”192 Engineering controls include “material substitution, 
process or equipment redesign, process or equipment sealing, enclo-
sure, or isolation, local exhaust ventilation, and employee isolation.”193 
OSHA speciªcally disfavors respirators as an engineering control, advis-
ing that they be “relied on only as a means of last resort because they 
simply do not provide a comprehensive and reliable method of em-
ployee protection, are uncomfortable and may themselves create safety 
and health hazards.”194
IV. The Toxic Substances Control Act, the  
Occupational Safety and Health Act,  
and Manufactured Nanomaterials 
 Part IV considers the intersection of the two federal statutes dis-
cussed above—TSCA and OSH Act—with manufactured nanomateri-
als, paying special attention to the opportunities and pitfalls that await 
those who choose to mass-produce nanomaterials. 
A. The Toxic Substances Control Act and Nanomaterials 
 Since TSCA principally regulates chemical substances, it is ªrst 
necessary to ask whether certain nanomaterials are “chemical sub-
stances” within the meaning of TSCA. Section 2602(2)(A) sweeps in 
much of the atomic universe with its expansive deªnition: “the term 
‘chemical substance’ means any organic or inorganic substance of a 
                                                                                                                      
191 Id. 
192 Identiªcation, Classiªcation and Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcino-
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particular molecular identity, including—(i) any combination of such 
substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reac-
tion or occurring in nature, and (ii) any element or uncombined radi-
cal.”195 Thus, it seems that most manufactured nanomaterials would be 
considered chemical substances within the meaning of TSCA.196
1. Nanomaterials and Filing a Premanufacture Notiªcation 
 One issue that needs to be considered is whether a smaller ver-
sion of an already existing material is “new” for TSCA classiªcation 
purposes.197 A manufacturer must look to see if the substance manu-
factured is already listed in the TSCA Inventory.198 Listed substances 
are existing chemicals, for which a manufacturer need not submit a 
premanufacture notice (PMN).199
 Before a chemical would appear in the Inventory, it likely would 
need a unique identifying number from the Chemical Abstracts Ser-
vice—called a Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (CASRN)— 
which is given to almost every new chemical and is internationally rec-
ognized.200 A number of popular nanomaterials have CASRNs: “carbon 
buckytubes,” 1333-86-4; “fullerenes, tubular,” 308068-56-6; “carbon 
ªbers, nanotubes,” 308068-63-0.201 Despite having a CASRN, none of 
these substances are currently in TSCA’s Inventory.202
 An interesting problem arises when a manufacturer seeks to 
make a nanosized version of a chemical already in the Inventory. At 
present, no mechanism exists to prevent a manufacturer from simply 
extrapolating toxicity information from the bulk-sized toxicity data on 
ªle.203 However, the very nature of a nanomaterial belies such simple 
                                                                                                                      
195 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (2000). Mixtures, pesticides, tobacco, nuclear materials, 
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198 See supra text accompanying note 91. 
199 Grifªn, supra note 88, at 11, 13. EPA, however, is in the process of reviewing this 
policy, so manufacturers should proceed cautiously if a bulk counterpart to a nanomaterial 
already appears in the Inventory. See Nanoscale Materials; Notice of Public Meeting, 70 
Fed. Reg. 24,574 (May 10, 2005) (providing notice of a public meeting to discuss a possible 
voluntary pilot reporting program for certain existing nanoscale materials). 
200 See supra note 91. 
201 Wardak, supra note 9, at 10. 
202 See id. To be certain that a substance is not already in the public or conªdential por-
tions of the Inventory, consultation with EPA is advised. See Grifªn, supra note 88, at 14. 
203 See Hett, supra note 11, at 36; see also supra text accompanying note 108. 
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analogy.204 The distinguishing feature of nanomaterials is that they do 
not necessarily behave like their larger counterparts when operating 
at the nanoscale.205 Thus, toxicity data that is on record for bulk-sized 
titanium dioxide, for example, will not necessarily apply to titanium 
dioxide nanoparticles.206 Theoretically, nothing—besides corporate 
conscience, fear of product liability lawsuits, and EPA and citizen vigi-
lance—stands in the way of a manufacturer commencing production 
of a nanosized version of an Inventory chemical with completely 
novel, inadequately tested, and potentially hazardous properties. 
 TSCA’s statutory exemptions may provide another route around 
the PMN requirement for creative CEOs of both the smallest start-ups 
and the largest multinational corporations.207 TSCA’s “solely-for-
export” exemption allows a manufacturer to avoid the PMN process if 
the chemical is produced for exportation only.208 Assuming a recipient 
country did not require extensive health and environmental effects 
data, a particularly skittish manufacturer could export a nanomaterial 
while awaiting results from U.S. government-funded health-effects re-
search.209
 Alternatively, a manufacturer could seek the protection of TSCA’s 
Low-Volume Exemption or Low-Release and Exposure Exemption 
(LoREx) by producing less than ten thousand kilograms per year.210 
This allows a large company to at least “get in the game” while the re-
search trickles out and investors get more comfortable with nanotech-
nology and its risks. This strategy also limits liability should nanomate-
rials turn out to be more harmful than most suspect at the moment. 
 At the same time, ten thousand kilograms per year might repre-
sent one hundred percent of a smaller company’s output. Indeed, 
currently, very few American companies appear to possess even this 
capability.211 While some American companies have begun construc-
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tion on multitonnage capable facilities, Japanese manufacturers have 
been less reluctant to churn out nanomaterials by the ton.212 The Na-
tional Science Foundation, perhaps conscious of this manufacturing 
gap, recently announced awards to establish the Center for High Rate 
Nanomanufacturing at Northeastern University, the Center for Af-
fordable Nanoengineering of Polymer Biomedical Devices at Ohio 
State University, and the Center for Templated Synthesis and Assem-
bly at the Nanoscale at University of Wisconsin–Madison.213
 For companies unable or unwilling to wait for academic and gov-
ernment research to yield helpful results, production of potentially 
hazardous new nanomaterials will commence after the ªling of a 
PMN.214 When ªling a PMN, a manufacturer is required to produce 
all environmental and health effects studies in the manufacturer’s 
“possession or control,” as well as descriptions of all other health and 
environmental effects data that the manufacturer knows about or can 
reasonably ascertain.215
 It must be emphasized that submitting a PMN does not require a 
manufacturer to produce new data or to conduct studies.216 Therefore, 
a manufacturer that proposed to mass-produce fullerenes or carbon 
nanotubes (CNTs) would not necessarily be forced to test those sub-
stances.217 However, the manufacturer would be obliged to disclose that 
large concentrations of fullerenes have been shown to cause brain 
damage in ªsh,218 or that large quantities of inhaled CNTs cause pul-
monary problems and death in lab rats.219
 Moreover, while a company can treat a large amount of proprie-
tary information as Conªdential Business Information under TSCA, 
EPA generally will not honor requests to keep health and safety stud-
ies conªdential.220 Thus, if a new nanomanufacturer is set to produce 
a substance that is sufªciently similar to a nanomaterial that has al-
ready been subjected to the PMN process, the new company is permit-
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ted to use the data already on ªle.221 Given the cost of conducting 
health and safety studies, this loophole offers signiªcant cost savings 
to the late-coming freerider, and represents a signiªcant penalty for 
the pioneering company.222
2. Nanomaterials and Section 4 Testing 
 The recent spike of government and university research into the 
potential adverse effects of nanomaterials on human health and the 
environment223 could—assuming the results are negative—accelerate 
a growing perception that nanomaterials may be unsafe. This would 
prompt EPA to assert its authority under section 4 of TSCA to prom-
ulgate test rules or enter into testing consent agreements.224 However, 
EPA is only permitted to force testing under certain conditions.225
 One such condition arises when the Interagency Testing Com-
mittee (ITC) recommends testing of a material by placing it on its 
Priority Testing List (PTL).226 A check of two recent PTLs, however, 
showed no chemicals that were obviously nanomaterials.227 In fact, 
both PTLs contain chemicals that were ªrst placed onto the list in 
1993, calling into question the speed with which chemicals move on 
and off the PTL.228 Thus, if EPA were to order section 4 testing for 
nanomaterials, it is more likely that the impetus would come from 
within EPA than from ITC.229
 In order to compel testing of nanomaterials, section 4(a)(1)(A) 
requires a showing of “unreasonable risk,” while section 4(a)(1)(B)— 
the B-policy—allows EPA to act in the face of unknown hazards if cer-
tain conditions are met.230 In order to ªnd an unreasonable risk, EPA 
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must make a showing of potential exposure and be armed with a sci-
entiªcally justiªable suspicion that the risk to humans may be 
signiªcant—usually brought on by evidence that the chemical is discov-
ered to be hazardous at very low levels.231 At present, while there is 
some hard evidence of potential health hazards from animal studies, 
the state of research into nanomaterials is probably not robust enough 
to conclude that they pose an unreasonable risk.232 As Andrew May-
nard of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) has commented, “‘[n]obody is saying here it’s a minor threat 
or a major threat—we just don’t know.’”233
 When faced with substances of unknown toxicity with the poten-
tial for substantial human exposure, the B-policy can provide 
justiªcation for ordering chemical studies.234 However, with the 
nanomaterial industry in its infancy, very few, if any, manufacturers 
produce enough nanomaterials to surpass the 1 million pound 
threshold required for the B-policy to take effect.235 For example, cur-
rent combined global production for both single-walled and multi-
walled nanotubes is approximately 109 tons.236 Total global produc-
tion capacity of multi-walled nanotubes may increase to 268 tons an-
nually by 2007, while production of single-walled nanotubes is ex-
pected to reach one hundred tons by 2008.237 Frontier Carbon, a 
Japanese corporation funded by Mitsubishi and the ªrst mass-
producer of fullerenes in the world, fabricates 40 tons of fullerenes 
per year and expects to increase production to three hundred tons by 
2007.238 Thus, in the next few years, there very well may be what the 
layperson would consider a “substantial” amount of nanomaterial 
production, but from TSCA’s standpoint, the production level does 
not meet the substantial threshold to merit testing.239
 Absent any rapid decision to lower the substantial production 
threshold signiªcantly just for engineered nanomaterials, might EPA 
                                                                                                                      
231 See Chloromethane and Chlorinated Benzenes Proposed Test Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 
48,524, 48,528 ( July 18, 1980). 
232 See supra Parts I.D–E. 
233 Helm, supra note 69 (quoting Andrew Maynard, Nat’l Inst. of Occupational Safety 
& Health). 
234 See Chloromethane and Chlorinated Benzenes Proposed Test Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. at 
48,528. 
235 See TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy, 58 Fed. Reg. 28,736, 28,746 
(May 14, 1993). 
236 See Cientiªca, supra note 27, at 9. 
237 Id. 
238 See Kelly, supra note 211. 
239 See TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy, 58 Fed. Reg. at 28,746. 
238 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:205 
order testing under section 4 anyway? The Final Statement of the B-
policy allows EPA to consider “additional factors” for substances that 
“do not meet the numerical thresholds” set by the B-policy.240 Given 
the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the safety and toxicity of 
nanomaterials, the impending boom in nanomaterial production, 
EPA’s apparent inability to respond meaningfully to a ªled PMN,241 
and the complicating factor that a given nanomaterial may behave 
differently depending on whether it is coated or uncoated, ªxed or 
free, or one-, two-, or three-dimensional, EPA would be well within 
reason if it decided to order formal test rules for certain engineered 
nanomaterials in order to ensure a modicum of safety.242
 However, the strongest push for testing might—and arguably 
should—come from the nanomanufacturing industry itself through 
voluntary testing consent agreements.243 First, testing consent agree-
ments allow the manufacturer to circumvent certain reporting, re-
cordkeeping, exportation, penalty, and judicial review requirements 
otherwise imposed by section 4 testing.244 Second, fears of EPA and 
industry striking a backroom deal without public input and appropri-
ate controls appear to be unfounded.245 The public is allowed an op-
portunity to participate in all phases of the negotiation and imple-
mentation of any agreement as “interested parties.”246 On the other 
hand, all signatories waive their right to challenge the consent agree-
ment on the basis that it is not a “rule” under section 4, signiªcantly 
reducing delays brought on by judicial review.247 Finally, 
 [u]se of a testing consent agreement in lieu of a formal 
test rule should not be viewed as indicating any intent to re-
lax the requirements relating to the actual testing conducted 
on the chemical. The data derived from chemical testing are 
expected to be of the same quality, regardless of whether the 
testing results from a rule or a consent agreement. The only 
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differences are in the formality of the procedures that lead 
up to testing.248
 If the decision in Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. 
Leavitt is any guide, the courts are beginning to respect EPA’s discre-
tionary authority to seek alternative arrangements to the formal test-
ing scheme.249 Indeed, as the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York has observed, “negotiation to determine appropriate 
test protocols as well as other relevant criteria certainly is not only 
permissible but indeed preferable to blind, often impractical, bureau-
cratic blundering.”250 Thus, nanomaterial manufacturers would do 
well to heed the advice of veteran chemical companies, who advocate 
a proactive approach to negotiations and exhort manufacturers to 
“lead the way” in suggesting testing methods.251 The Chemical Manu-
facturers Association, for one, has gone a step further and is in the 
midst of a self-imposed, multi-year, $67 million program of “basic re-
search on the potential carcinogenic, endocrine disruption, and res-
piratory effects of industrial chemicals.”252 In a similar fashion, reli-
ance on government and academic research for health and safety data 
should decrease as the nanotechnology sector matures and funds 
suitable research similar to other developed industries.253
B. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Nanomaterials 
 “The National Science Foundation has estimated that 2 million 
workers will be needed to support nanotechnology industries world-
wide within 15 years.”254 In the short-term, the Royal Society believes 
that “[t]he greatest potential for exposure . . . over the next few years 
will be in the workplace, both in industry and in universities.”255 Al-
though NIOSH is in the process of producing a “best practices” 
document for working with nanomaterials, nanomaterial manufactur-
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ers still need to be aware of the many OSHA compliance issues which 
will arise in the production of potentially hazardous nanomaterials.256
 Currently, there are no nanomaterial-speciªc OSHA rules or Per-
missible Exposure Limits (PELs).257 Nor has the American Conference 
of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) proposed any expo-
sure limits.258 But, to borrow John Mendeloff’s rubric, occupational 
disease may still arise from “exposures from existing substances for 
which neither OSHA nor anyone else has proposed exposure limits.”259 
The key is whether a given nanomaterial would be considered a “rec-
ognized hazard” within the meaning of the general duty clause.260 
Since the American National Standards Institute has not yet developed 
standards,261 the issue reduces to whether it is the common knowledge 
of safety experts in the ªeld that a given nanomaterial is hazardous.262
 This test would probably look to ofªcial statements from NIOSH 
for guidance. In this regard, NIOSH has thus far offered only non-
committal, conservative statements, like the following from its ofªcial 
website: 
 Occupational health risks associated with manufacturing 
and using nanomaterials are not yet clearly understood. . . . 
. . . . 
 Workers within nanotechnology-related industries have the 
potential to be exposed to uniquely engineered materials with 
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novel sizes, shapes and physical and chemical properties, at 
levels far exceeding ambient concentrations. To understand 
the impact of these exposures on health, and how best to de-
vise appropriate exposure monitoring and control strategies, 
much research is still needed. Until a clearer picture emerges, 
the limited evidence available would suggest caution when po-
tential exposures to nanoparticles may occur.263
While accurate, this is not the most helpful statement for a manufac-
turer producing nanomaterials today—what should they do to protect 
their workers from injury and their corporation from liability? 
 First, if an employer is in possession of data that unequivocally 
demonstrates that a particular nanomaterial is “likely to cause death 
or serious physical harm to . . . employees,” then the employer has a 
duty to mitigate the threat of that hazard.264 Likewise, if a substance 
shows carcinogenic effects in lab animals, OSHA is empowered to is-
sue an Emergency Temporary Standard under section 6.265 Nanoma-
terials currently pose a unique problem because it is too early for 
anyone to say with any degree of scientiªc certainty that occupational 
exposure to nanomaterials poses a health hazard.266 However, it 
would be disingenuous of anyone, particularly a manufacturer con-
cerned about the potential of product liability lawsuits, to say—in the 
absence of health effects data to the contrary—that his or her nano-
material is deªnitely safe; the literature abounds with cautionary 
statements that imply the opposite.267 Thus, the prudent course of 
action is to proceed as if the material in question is actually hazard-
ous, obligating the manufacturer to engage in adequate hazard com-
munication.268
 Consider, in this respect, the United Kingdom’s response to the 
Royal Society’s report on nanomaterials: 
 The Government accepts that chemicals in the form of 
nanoparticles or nanotubes can exhibit different properties to 
                                                                                                                      
263 Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health, supra note 209. 
264 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). 
265 See Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160–61 (3d 
Cir. 1974). 
266 The HCS regulations deªne health hazard as “a chemical for which there is statisti-
cally signiªcant evidence based on at least one study conducted in accordance with estab-
lished scientiªc principles that acute or chronic health effects may occur in exposed em-
ployees.” Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(1) (2004). 
267 See supra Parts I.D–E. 
268 See supra Part III.B. (describing HCS). 
242 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:205 
the bulk form of the chemical; sometimes this is beneªcial 
and sometimes it may be potentially hazardous. The Govern-
ment also accepts that safety testing on the basis of a larger 
form of a chemical cannot be used to infer the safety of the 
nanoparticulate form of the same chemical and that therefore 
individual regulations within the existing framework will need 
to be reviewed to reºect the possibility that nanoparticulate 
material may have greater toxicity than material in the larger 
size range.269
However, the current practice in preparing information for a Material 
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) appears to be precisely what the Royal So-
ciety and United Kingdom consider ill-advised.270
 The MSDS for titanium dioxide nanopowder, for example, con-
tains the same information as the regular titanium dioxide MSDS.271 
Even though this information might be wholly inapplicable and inade-
quate, “the safety data sheet for nano-titanium dioxide powder still rec-
ommends that a dust respirator be worn while handling this substance, 
although such masks are known to offer only limited protection.”272
 While referring the user to the safety information for titanium di-
oxide is somewhat helpful, reliance on the safety measures in place for 
bulk-sized titanium dioxide are at best misleading, and at worst dan-
gerous. Such reliance could be dangerous because of a ªfth category of 
occupational disease caused by toxic substances that Mendeloff did not 
speciªcally identify—diseases resulting from a substance which has 
been assigned an inappropriate PEL.273 A bulk-sized PEL automatically 
assigned to any nanomaterial is potentially an inappropriate designa-
tion. Nevertheless, a manufacturer is entirely within its rights in taking 
that step under the current OSHA scheme.274
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 To prevent the widespread use of bulk-sized information for 
nanomaterial MSDSs, OSHA could attempt to curb the practice by 
making an example of one manufacturer. OSHA could achieve this by 
issuing an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) under section 6 for a 
hazardous nanomaterial of its choosing.275 An ETS is particularly ap-
propriate when dealing with substances of unknown toxicity—as is the 
case with most nanomaterials—since all that is required is “more than 
some possibility” of danger; no absolute certainty is required.276 More-
over, if evidence of a nanomaterial’s carcinogenicity in animals were to 
surface, OSHA could act immediately to protect humans working with 
the substance.277 However, since an ETS is only effective for six months 
and a permanent standard must be promulgated soon thereafter, 
OSHA would be more likely to develop nanomaterial-speciªc PELs 
than to issue a slew of ETSs in response to adverse health data.278
 When OSHA does promulgate nano-speciªc regulations and 
PELs, it need not be intimidated by the inexact state of research. As 
the Supreme Court explained, OSHA is entitled to “some leeway 
where its ªndings must be made on the frontiers of scientiªc knowl-
edge.”279 However, employers should take care that any work practice 
mandated by OSHA actually protects their workers from known haz-
ards. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held in UAW v. General Dy-
namics Land Systems Division: “[I]f . . . an employer knows a particular 
safety standard is inadequate to protect his workers against [a] 
speciªc hazard . . . he has a duty under section 5(a)(1) to take what-
ever measures may be required by the Act . . . to safeguard his work-
ers.”280
 Consider in this respect an informational note produced by the 
United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE).281 In line with 
American practice, the HSE note emphasizes the importance of miti-
gating risk through adequate environmental control measures before 
resorting to the use of personal protective equipment, such as respira-
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tors and facemasks.282 HSE adds, however, that “[i]f your control 
measures are based on pre-existing standards then you should ensure 
that these standards are relevant for nanoparticles. . . . [E]ngineering 
solutions should be sought, such as containment or effective and ap-
propriate local exhaust ventilation eg [sic] fume cupboards.”283 If en-
gineering solutions prove ineffective, resorting to personal protective 
equipment is permissible.284 However, HSE warns that all respirator 
ªlters should be checked with the manufacturer to ensure that they 
will prevent nanoparticles from passing through.285 Finally, HSE ad-
vises that “[f]or the highest levels of protection, [self-contained 
breathing apparatus] having a correctly ªtted full-face mask and posi-
tive demand compressed air supply will be required.”286
C. Lessons for the Nanomaterial Manufacturer 
 Under both TSCA and OSH Act statutory schemes, there is am-
ple opportunity for a nanomaterial to slip virtually unnoticed out of 
the chemical plant and into the stream of commerce. TSCA currently 
allows nanomaterial manufacturers to analogize to bulk materials al-
ready in the Inventory and to use the test data previously gener-
ated.287 In addition, nano-sized versions of Inventory chemicals tech-
nically may be produced without ªling a PMN.288 TSCA also contains 
a number of statutory exemptions to ªling a PMN.289 Even if a PMN 
must be ªled, EPA may never take action on it.290
 As for OSH Act, there is a strong argument that nanomaterials 
would not currently be considered a “recognized” hazard within the 
meaning of the general duty clause.291 Current industry practice also 
seems to condone the use of PELs developed for bulk-sized materials 
on nanomaterial MSDSs.292 These MSDSs in turn recommend the use 
of work practice controls that potentially provide inadequate protec-
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tion against worker inhalation, ingestion, and skin absorption of 
nanomaterials.293
 Nevertheless, while perfunctory compliance with TSCA and OSH 
Act provisions is certainly possible and will provide a certain amount 
of insulation from liability, the risk that a given nanomaterial will turn 
out to be toxic argues in favor of some form of manufacturer-initiated 
testing before mass-production.294 The exact level of testing to under-
take depends on the individual manufacturer’s tolerance for risk, in-
cluding the possibility of protracted, costly litigation. The testing ar-
rangements described herein appear to be the most palatable option 
for the manufacturer interested in protecting workers, the public, and 
the bottom line.295
Conclusion 
 Nanotechnology promises untold beneªts for the future. But sci-
entiªc progress with respect to manufactured nanomaterials and their 
myriad applications may be outpacing appreciation of the environ-
mental, safety, and health risks associated with these materials. TSCA 
and OSH Act provide part of the existing regulatory framework that 
will be used to address and mitigate hazards that may be posed by 
these substances. A manufacturer that fails to investigate and test the 
safety of a nanomaterial before its release into the stream of com-
merce—based on manipulation of statutory exemptions and clever 
interpretation of statutory language—does more than expose itself to 
liability, it reveals its lack of concern for the welfare of both its workers 
and the public. 
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